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Just when China’s leaders receive conflicting signals of “overheating” and “below-potential growth”, they 
encounter tremendous external pressure to revalue the Renminbi (RMB) substantially.  Our conclusion is that 
the major macroeconomic challenges have their roots in China’s inadequate marketization and continued 
discrimination against the domestic private sector.  The monopoly state banks intermediate the large volume of 
savings not only inefficiently but also inadequately.  The latter results in aggregate demand expanding slower 
than supply-side growth, imparting a deflationary tendency to the economy.  The present remedy of increased 
public-directed investments can be a satisfactory solution in the short run, but they are a disaster in the long run 
because they would follow an increasingly rent-seeking path that is wasteful as in Japan (e.g. wasteful projects 
that benefit politically-connected companies), and the increased state enterprise investments would convert 
themselves into nonperforming loans.  In partially-reformed China, public-directed investments via the state 
enterprises tend to veer out of control frequently and overheat the economy. 
   
China’s persistent trade surplus is fundamentally linked to the deflation phenomenon because a chronic trade 
surplus means that national savings is larger than domestic investments, the result of inadequate financial 
intermediation.  China should now expand its investment program to incorporate large import-intensive 
infrastructure projects as the alternative to the appreciation the RMB, or as an important complement to limited 
RMB appreciation.  The additional construction would create jobs, relieve production bottlenecks, and preserve 
employment in China's export-oriented sectors.  The long-run solution to eradicating the deflation bias and the 
tendency toward current account surplus lies in establishing an efficient financial intermediation mechanism. 
  
Frequent bank recapitalization is the biggest threat to China’s fiscal solvency and macroeconomic stability.  Our 
calculations conclude that the forthcoming second recapitalization since 1997 is the last one that China can 
afford.  Even then, fiscal solvency and macroeconomic management requires that the state continues keeping 
interest rates artificially low in order to avoid reducing the present fiscal stimulus to accommodate the servicing 
of the bonds issued for the bank bailout.  In short, China faces a difficult tradeoff between the maintenance of 
fiscal stimulus to keep growth on track and the promotion of financial market development via recapitalizing the 
state banks, splitting them up and privatising some of them, liberalising the establishment of private financial 
institutions, improving prudential monitoring and enforcement, and deregulating interest rates. 
 
The entry of Western banks into China’s financial markets is not the same thing as the opening of the capital 
account.  China would not be well served by a rapid opening of the capital account because foreign banks could 
suddenly become conduits for large-scale capital flight, or for rapid swings in short-term lending and 
repayments, or facilitators of bank runs (in which depositors do not merely switch banks, or switch from 
domestic banks to domestic currency, but actually switch from domestic deposits to foreign assets).  Just as in 
financial market liberalization, capital account opening should also proceed in stages, because it must be 
accompanied by sophisticated financial market regulation, something that is clearly not in place at this time. 
   
The state-owned sector and state-controlled companies are still a serious threat to sustained high growth, 
banking sector solvency, and price stability.  Worse, yet, the corruption within state enterprises undermine social 
stability.  The transformation to a private market economy should be accelerated by faster privatization of state 
enterprises, and the reduction in legal discrimination against private sector activities.         1 
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Section 1: Introduction 
  The quandary in macroeconomic management that the Chinese government is facing at 
the present cannot be seen more clearly than in the two newspaper headlines that appeared on 
two consecutive days in August 2003.  On 18 August 2003, an article in the Straits Times of 
Singapore under the headline of “Hu calls for more work creation as jobless rate rises” reported 
that the Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, Hu Jin Tao, had called for “stronger 
measures… [like] fiscal subsidies, tax incentives, insurance subsidies and credit opportunities” to 
spur economic growth.  On 19 August 2003, the South China Morning Post of Hong Kong 
carried an article headlined “Investments soar amid reluctance to rein in growth” which reported 
that the Chairman of the State Development and Reform Commission, Ma Kai, had “urged the 
nation to be wary of overheating and unveiled measures to cut back lending at state-run banks.”  
  Have China’s recent macroeconomic policies been too cautious?  Or have they been too 
inflationary?  The evidence in favor  of the first assessment are the successive negative inflation 
rates since 1997, and continued weak aggregate demand is suggested by the -0.4 percent inflation 
rate in the first half of 2003.  The case for overheating would appeal to, first, the GDP growth 
rate in the first quarter of 2003 was 8.9 percent; second, fiscal and monetary stimuli were greatly         2 
ramped up in the March to June period to offset the negative consequences of SARS
1; three, the 
price index for intermediate input has risen by 5 percent since the beginning of 2003; and, fourth, 
inflation has traditionally lagged behind excessive growth by nine to twelve months. 
  The cost of erring on the overly conservative side is certainly a high one.  The official 
growth target of 7 percent in 2003 could create only 10 million new urban jobs, and there are 24 
million urban job-seekers.
2  On top of this, 150 million of China’s 500 million rural workforce 
are “effectively” unemployed – and this is the most conservative estimate!
3  The cost of 
overheating could also be very big because high inflations in the past had sometimes undermined 
social stability.  Furthermore, overheating is many times the symptom that the state credit system 
has been undermining the economic restructuring objectives by bailing out inefficient state 
enterprises, and funding investments in sectors with excess capacity. 
  As if China’s macroeconomic managers are not already sufficiently vexed by the 
confusing signals of “overheating” and “below-potential growth”, they now face tremendous 
political pressures from Japan, Western Europe, and the United States to revalue the Renminbi 
(RMB) substantially.
4  The current round of external indignation over an undervalued RMB was 
set off on 1 December 2002 when two senior officials of Japan’s ministry of Finance wrote in the 
Financial Times that “China is exporting deflation…through export growth and a combination of 
                                                 
1 Employers in SARS-affected areas were also ordered “not to lay off workers”; see “China Tries to 
Stanch Economic Fallout as Disease, Worry Spread: Emergency Policies Boost Public Spending,” 
Washington Post, 9 May 2003. 
2 If realized, the official urban employment rate would rise from 4 percent at the end of  2002 to 4.2 
percent in at the end of 2003.  Data are from “Economy not working hard enough,” South China Morning 
Post, 16 August 2003.  However, the official data on urban unemployment are well-known for 
understating the problem.  When the official urban unemployment rate was 3.6 percent in June 2002, a 
Chinese Academy of Social Studies report estimated the actual urban unemployment rate to be 7 percent, 
and Liu Wei of Beijing University estimated it to be 14.6 percent.  See "China jobless figures enter 
danger zone," Straits Times, 15th June 2002.  
3 “Budget and job woes threaten stability,” South China Morning Post, 19 December 2002.  
4 For example, “Snow calls on Beijing to let currency float,” Financial Times, 2 September 2003.         3 
price deflation and an exchange rate pegged to the dollar,” and they asked China “to allow the 
currency to appreciate.”  (Kuroda and Kawai, 2002).  This clarion call to mobilize international 
opinion for action on the RMB appears to have succeeded.  By mid-2003, South Korea, Western 
Europe, and the United States have joined Japan in urging an appreciation of the RMB, probably 
in response to the adamant charges levied by their domestic industries about unfair competition 
from cheap Chinese imports.
5  How China will respond to this foreign clamor for RMB 
revaluation will, not surprisingly, depend on its diagnosis of the current macroeconomic 
situation.  The Chinese leaders are more likely to agree quickly to making the RMB much more 
expensive, if they are convinced that the economy is overheated; and unlikely to go beyond the 
immediate introduction of a minor trading band around the current RMB-US$ exchange rate if 
they conclude that deflation is a more plausible threat to China's economic growth. 
  In assessing the two contradictory desired stances of macroeconomic policies, the 
relevant analytical issue for an economist is whether China is already at the “natural” rate of 
unemployment.  An output growth rate that pushes the actual unemployment rate above the 
natural unemployment rate would not be unsustainable but would also risk generating a high 
inflation rate.  The point is that, at any moment in time, there is a maximum value on the 
sustainable output growth rate that is determined by the existing material and institutional 
conditions of the economy (and of the outside world).  So unless the higher growth rate desired 
by the policymaker is below the “natural” growth rate, more expansionary macroeconomic 
policies will not deliver that desired higher growth rate.  
  The operational difficulty for macroeconomic management is that the natural growth rate 
of an economy is not immutable over time.  For example, a rise in the rate of technological 
                                                 
5 See, for example, “Behind the Debate over China’s Currency,” Barrons, 28 July, 2003; “U.S. Job Losses 
Blamed on China’s Currency,” The New York Times, 26 August 2003; and “Economic ministers discuss 
Chinese currency,” Pacific Business News, 23 July 2003.         4 
innovation would increase the natural growth rate, while the steady convergence of a formerly 
autarkic developing country to the frontier of modern science would cause a steady decline in the 
natural growth rate.  Hence, because of the latter phenomenon of growth slowdown upon 
economic maturation, it is not so straightforward to claim that China’s annualized growth rate of 
8.2 percent in the first half of 2003 is below the natural output growth rate despite the twin facts, 
one, that the 2003 growth state is more than a percentage point below the 9.4 percent average 
growth rate of the 1979-2002 period; and, two, that the inflation rate of -0.4 percent in the first 
half of 2003 is substantially below the 5.5 percent average of the 1979-2002 period.
6  One needs 
a more compelling argument against the alternative explanation that the lower 2003 growth rate 
simply reflects a lower natural output growth rate, and that slightly negative inflation is 
compatible with being on the natural growth path.  
  To anticipate the analysis of this paper, we will highlight here five of our conclusions.  
First, while it is important to manipulate aggregate demand via monetary-fiscal policies to keep 
the actual unemployment rate close to the natural unemployment rate, China is in the fortunate 
position where it can implement other economic policies that will move the natural 
unemployment rate downward, i.e. increase the natural output growth rate.  To use a production 
analogy, the biggest gain comes not only from keeping an engine running at peak efficiency but 
also from having the engine with the largest capacity.  In short, the most important economic 
task for China is to adopt the best economic growth engine that world economic history has 
identified: a market economy where competitive private enterprises constitute the norm, and 
where the state focuses mainly on the provision of public goods and social insurance.  The case 
                                                 
6 The inflation rate is calculated from the retail price index (RPI). The average inflation rate according to 
the consumer price index (CPI) (available from 1985) is 0.6 percent for the first of 2003 and 7.7 percent 
for the 1985-2002 period.  CPI is broader than RPI because it also covers services and housing.  The 2003 
GDP growth rate is from “National economy faces a string of challenges,” China Daily, 26 August 2003.          5 
for making this type of market economy the new growth engine is obvious when one recognizes 
that China’s remarkable growth in the post-1978 period has come from the deregulation that has 
allowed Chinese economic institutions to converge to those of private market economies, 
especially of the East Asian variety.
7  
            Second, many of the major macroeconomic challenges facing the Chinese government 
have their roots in China’s inadequate marketization and continued discrimination against the 
domestic private sector.  Because of the bureaucratic incentives within the state-controlled banks 
which monopolize the financial system, the large volume of savings is not only inefficiently but 
also inadequately intermediated into investment (with the private component of investment 
especially deprived of bank loans).  The important consequence of inadequate intermediation is a 
level of aggregate demand that expands slower than the natural output growth rate.  The state has 
thereby responded to the deflationary tendency by undertaking massive public investments to 
soak up the excess savings in the banks.  While increased public-directed investments can be a 
satisfactory solution in the short run, they are a disaster in the long run.  The point is that an 
efficient banking system is an indispensable component of the new growth engine that China 
needs to put in place. 
Third, China’s persistent trade surplus is fundamentally linked to the deflation 
phenomenon, and successful solution of one will mean successful solution of the other.  A 
chronic trade surplus means that national savings is chronically larger than domestic 
investments, which is exactly the malaise of inadequate financial intermediation.  An alternative 
to revaluing the RMB would therefore be increasing the level of domestic investment, especially 
targeting investment projects which require large amounts of imported capital equipment.  It is 
                                                 
7 This interpretation of China's economic performance after 1978 is elaborated in Woo (1999) and Woo 
(2001).         6 
hard to over-emphasize that it is extremely anomalous for a developing economy like China to 
be exporting capital to the rest of the world – the counterpart of a current account surplus.  There 
just has to be something fundamentally flawed when capital-shortage China is investing abroad 
just like capital-abundant Japan.   
   Fourth, frequent bank recapitalization is the biggest threat to China’s fiscal solvency and 
macroeconomic stability.  The state banking system now needs to be recapitalized for the second 
time since 1997, and our calculations conclude that this second recapitalization is the last one 
that China can afford.  Even then, fiscal solvency and macroeconomic management requires that 
the state continues keeping interest rates artificially low in order to avoid reducing the present 
fiscal stimulus to accommodate the servicing of the bonds issued for the bank bailout.  In short, 
China faces a difficult tradeoff between the maintenance of fiscal stimulus to keep growth on 
track and the promotion of financial market development via bank recapitalization and interest 
rate deregulation.   
            Fifth, the state-owned sector and state-controlled companies are still a serious threat to 
sustained high growth, banking sector solvency, and price stability.  Worse, yet, the corruption 
within state enterprises undermine social stability.  The switch to the new growth engine 
necessitates that China continues the privatization of nondefense-related state enterprises that are 
not natural monopolies, and the reduction in legal discrimination against private sector activities.   
  The organization of the paper is as follows.  Sections 2 and 3 identify the factors behind 
the macroeconomic performance in the period since 1997.  Section 4 discusses the working of 
the dysfunctional banking system, and Section 5 analyses the issue of fiscal solvency.  Section 6 
examines the impact of the SOE sector on the macroeconomic stability.  Section 7 presents our 
final observations.         7 
 
Section 2: A Slower Growth Phase, and the Attempts at Macroeconomic Stimulation 
  Our theoretical prior is that the partially-reformed Chinese economy entered into a slower 
growth phase near the end of the 1990s, having largely exhausted the growth potential created by 
the significant economic deregulation and internationalization.  This hunch is in line with the 
growth data in Table 1.  The average annual growth rate in the 1997-2002 period is 9.4 percent, 
and every growth rate in the 1997-2002 subperiod is below 9.4 percent.  This extended period of 
below-average growth is unprecedented in the market reform period.  When we compared the 
mean growth rate of the 1979-1996 subperiod (9.92 percent) with the mean growth rate of the 
1997-2002 subperiod (7.83 percent), we found the difference between them to be statistically 
significant.  The t-statistic is 2.52.   
  The analytically difficult question is whether the lower growth rates in the 1997-2002 
subperiod reflected inadequate growth in aggregate demand or a reduction in the growth 
potential of aggregate supply.  The fact that there was a statistically significant downward shift in 
the inflation rate between the two subperiods -- the t-statistic is 5.66 – with price changes being 
negative in the 1997-2002 subperiod, raises the possibility that inadequate demand had 
contributed to the lower growth rates in the second subperiod.  This implication follows because, 
in the absence of a drop in aggregate demand growth, a fall in supply growth would have 
produced an outcome of lower growth-cum-higher inflation (i.e. stagflation) rather than the 
observed outcome of lower growth-cum-deflation.  In total, the evidence in Table 1 suggest that 
the natural output growth rate at present is likely to be higher than 7.8 percent. 
  Our explanation for the lower growth-cum-deflation phenomenon in the 1997-2002 
subperiod is that there was not only a slowdown in supply-side growth but also a slowdown in         8 
aggregate demand growth.  In the next sector, we will develop the argument that China's 
dysfunctional banking system has created a deflationary bias in the economy. 
  In thinking about the growth of aggregate supply, there is little justification for the belief 
that there is a positive relationship between the actual growth rate and the inflation rate for all 
values of the growth rate.  It is more likely that, if a positive relationship exists at all within any 
short time period, it is limited to a limited range of growth rates clustered around the natural 
growth rate, say, half a percentage point on each side of the natural growth rate.
8  Our estimate is 
that the natural output growth rate in 2003, as permitted by China’s material conditions and 
institutional structure, is 8 percent.  Our estimate is higher than the 7.5 percent in Huang (2003), 
and the official growth target of 7 percent; and is at the high end of the 7 to 8 percent range in Yu 
(2003).  We also estimate that, in the absence of substantial reforms to enable the rapid 
emergence of a dynamic domestic private sector, the natural growth rate would decline to 7.5 
percent at the end of the decade as the catching-up process proceeds further.  However, if the 
needed comprehensive reforms are in place, then the natural growth rate at the end of decade 
would be 8.5 percent.   
Our hypothesis that China has entered into a slower growth phase slower is consistent 
with the employment data reported in Table 2.  The average annual employment growth in the 
industrial sector was 2.8 percent during the 1992-1997 period, with a minimum of 2.1 percent in 
1997.  The employment growth rate fell significantly after 1997: 0.3 percent in 1998, -1.1 
percent in 1999, -1.2 percent in 2000, and 0.4 percent in 2001.  The employment situation in the 
manufacturing component of the industrial had actually turned bad earlier in 1996.  
                                                 
8 Graphing the growth-inflation relationship, with the inflation rate on the y-axis, the relationship is a 
vertical line at each endpoint of the range.  This does not mean that the positive portion of the graph could 
be exploitable for macrostabilisation, changes in expectations could shift it up and down very quickly.         9 
Manufacturing employment growth was negative throughout the 1996-2000 period, with a 
particularly large decline of 13.5 percent in 1998. 
Price deflation appeared in the Retail Price Index (RPI) in October 1997, and in the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) in February 1998.  When it became apparent by the middle of 1998 
that the economy was slowing down significantly, the government began to implement monetary 
and fiscal measures to boost aggregate demand.  The government's increasing vigorous efforts at 
economic stimulation are summarized in Figures 1 and 2, and Table 3.  The interest rate has been 
reduced eight times in less then six years, with the latest rate cut on 21 February 2001, which 
brought the 1-year deposit rate to 1.98 percent and the 1-year lending rate to 2.34 percent – see 
Figure 1.  However, money growth rates followed a declining trend in 2001.  The central bank 
then began not only to increase reserves more aggressively but also to lean even more on the 
state banks to extend credit. 
The annualized (year-on-year, yoy) growth rate of fixed asset investment of the state 
sector was kept above 15 percent from July 1998 to July 1999 period, and then lowered as 
exports to the other East Asian economics recovered, see Figure 2.  Fiscal stimulus was renewed 
in 2001. States spending on capital construction jumped from Rmb209.5 billion in 2000 to 
Rmb251.8 billion in 2001, which kept the annualized growth rate of state sector fixed asset 
investment above 15 percent for 11 of the 12 months in 2001.  When the CPI slipped again into 
negative growth rates falling in November 2001 (reaching -1.3 percent in April 2002), the 
Chinese government increased the intensity of the fiscal stimulus e.g. the growth rate of state 
sector fixed asset investment was above 23 percent in the January 2002 to November 2002 
period, and was 17 percent in December 2002.  Apart from investment in capital construction, 
the government also implemented several pay rises in this period.  The result of this jump in         10 
government spending is that the fiscal deficit has increased substantially from 1.1 percent of 
GDP in 1998 to 1.9 percent in 1999, 2.5 percent in 2000, 2.7 percent in 2001, and 2.9 percent in 
2002, see Table 3.
 9  Most government economists, e.g. Jia (2002), believe that the investment 
using funds raised through treasury bond issuance contributed about 2 percentage points to GDP 
growth each year in the 1999-2002 period. 
  With the encouragement of the central bank, especially with the onset of SARS in early 
2003, the state banks expanded their loans greatly, especially to the real estate sector, and money 
growth went from 16.8 percent in 2002:4Q to reach 20.0 percent in 2003:2Q.  The combination 
of additional fiscal and monetary stimulus to offset the deleterious effects of SARS on aggregate 
demand caused the rate of fixed asset investment to jump from 21.6 percent in 2002:4Q to 32.4 
percent in 2003:1Q and 31.7 percent in 2003:2Q.  The unfortunate feature about encouraging 
SOE investments, as emphasized by Fan and Woo (1996), is that, in a partially-reformed 
centrally-planned economy, there are many institutional features that motivate SOE investments 
to veer out of control frequently, and overheat the economy as a byproduct. 
 
Section 3:  The Deflationary and Trade Account Consequences of Inadequate Financial 
Intermediation 
At a superficial level, the systemic deflationary pressures that have plagued China since 
1997 have their sources in, one, a shrinking money multiplier (a phenomenon that many Chinese 
economists have called "the liquidity trap"), and, two, a slowing down in the growth of 
                                                 
9 Citigroup (2003) has projected the budget deficit to be 2.8 percent in 2003.  The scale of the fiscal 
stimulus has evoked comparisons with the New Deal, and provoked catchy headlines in the media, e.g. 
"China Gambles on Big Projects for its Stability," New York Times, 13 January 2003, and "Public 
Spending Explodes," Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 January 2003.          11 
consumption (a phenomenon commonly known as "the paradox of thrift").
10  China has tried to 
boost the domestic economy with successive cuts in interest rates, but the rise in credit creation 
has been much lower than expected, except for the periods when the central bank leaned heavily 
upon the banks.
 11  The paradox of thrift refers to the low level of private aggregate demand 
because the private saving rate has been increasing.  The saving rate has gone from almost 20 
percent of GDP in 1981 to 30 percent in 1988, and then to almost 40 percent in 2001. 
At a deeper level, however, both of these phenomena, we suggest, spring from the same 
cause, which is the absence of adequate financial intermediation in China.  The liquidity trap 
made its appearance in the mid-1990s when Zhu Rongji decreed the removal of the state bank 
manager if the ratio of non-performing loans in her bank were to go up two years consecutively.  
As the majority of state enterprises are either in the red or just breaking even, the banks became 
unwilling to lend money to the state-owned enterprises.  Lending more to private enterprises is 
not really a good option because, one, their legal status is lower than that of state enterprises, 
and, two, there was no reliable way to assess their balance sheets.  The only activity that the 
banks are happy to allocate their funds to is the purchase of state bonds, i.e. the financing of the 
government's deficit.
 12  The elimination of the liquidity trap requires that the state removes the 
barriers to lending to the private sector by ending legal discrimination against them, and 
                                                 
10 Keynes coined both terms.  Strictly speaking, the Chinese characterisation of the liquidty trap as a 
"shrinking money multiplier" does not correspond to Keynes's original meaning.  Keynes was referring to 
the situation where the interest rate would not fall despite the addition of reserves because of the 
overwhelming dominant expectation held by investors that the interest rate would rise soon.  In brief, the 
difference is "the shrinking money multiplier" versus "the non-falling interest rate."  
11 For example, during the SARS period, the banks faced intense pressure from the central bank to extend 
credit. 
12 The Chinese government has sought to increase bank lending to private individuals by encouraging 
banks to establish mortgage loans, which are perceived as less risky because of their seemingly fully 
collateralized nature.  While it is still early to tell, it appears that the enthusiasm for real estate lending in 
2002 might have started a speculative bubble in that sector.         12 
establishing uniform accounting and auditing standards that have credible enforcement 
mechanisms. 
In discussions on the rise of the savings rate, a common view is that the rise reflects the 
uncertainty about the future that many SOE workers feel in the face of widespread privatisation 
of loss-making SOEs.  We find this explanation to be grossly incomplete because there has also 
been a rise in the rural saving rate even though rural residents have little to fear about the loss of 
jobs in the state-enterprise sector because none of them are employed there.  Based on the work 
of Liu and Woo (1994) on savings behavior, we conjecture that the desire to invest is an 
important reason for why the rural sector has increased its savings rate.  The most dynamic 
industrial expansion in China in the 1984-1994 period occurred in the rural areas.  Since non-
state firms in the rural areas cannot borrow from the bank, the only way they could establish 
themselves was through self-financing, which required the would-be entrepreneurs to save first.  
In the very first phase of rural industrialization, the amount of capital that was needed to start a 
factory workshop was very low.  After a decade of rapid industrial growth, the Chinese 
countryside is saturated with labor-intensive enterprises.  As competition among rural enterprises 
is very fierce at the present, it no longer makes economic sense to invest and open the same type 
of factory workshop.  Rural enterprises must therefore move up to the next stage of value added 
production in order to be more profitable.  This new generation of rural enterprises is much more 
capital-intensive, and thus requires a much larger amount of startup funds.  And rural residents 
have responded to the higher capital requirements by increasing their saving rates.   
Since the phenomenon of investment-motivated saving must also be present within the 
Chinese urban community the usual pessimism-based explanation for the rise in the urban saving 
rate is only partially correct.  In fact, with the steady relaxation of regulations against the         13 
establishment of private businesses in the rural and urban areas, the amount of investment-
motivated savings in China could only have risen more.  To skeptics of our investment-
motivated savings hypothesis, we want to point out that Jeffrey Williamson (1988), an economic 
historian, has summed up the historical record of Western Europe and North America as showing 
that "investment demand seems to have been the driving force behind private saving and 
accumulation, past and present."
13 
Table 4 reports the investment trends in China in the post-1978 era.  Total fixed 
investment has increased secularly as a proportion of GDP: an annual average of 28.8 percent in 
1984-1988, 34.0 percent in 1992-1996, and 36.3 percent in 1997-2001.  SOE investment went up 
in the 1992-96 period (19.8 percent) and then returned to the initial 1984-88 level (18.7 percent).  
We are of the opinion, however, that the amount of state-directed investment in the 1997-2001 
period could be more than three percentage points higher than 18.7 percent of GDP because 
many of the big SOEs of 1988 had by 1999 converted themselves (or components of themselves) 
to share-holding companies listed on the stock exchanges – while remaining state-controlled.  
Furthermore, many SOES have formed joint-venture firms with domestic and foreign companies, 
with themselves as the controlling shareholders. 
Contrary to the secular rise in total investment and the likely secular rise in state-directed 
investment, rural investment has fallen secularly from 8.2 percent in 1984-88, to 7.7 percent in 
1992-96, and then to 7.5 percent in 1997-2001.  Our hypothesis is that a major reason for the 
decline in the rural investment ratio is that the traditional labor-intensive factory is no longer 
profitable, and rural entrepreneurs have been unable to borrow the money to undertake the more 
                                                 
13 See Liu and Woo (1994) and Woo and Liu (1995) for a formal model of investment-motivated savings, 
and for empirical confirmation of this hypothesis.         14 
capital-intensive investments required for the next generation of rural enterprises.
14  The 
investment-GDP ratio went up at the national level because FDI went up while state investments 
(through the budget, state-owned enterprises, and state-controlled enterprises) utilised the higher 
domestic savings fully. 
  We now turn to show that another outcome of inadequate financial intermediation is a 
chronic current account surplus.  To see this point, consider the following accounting 
relationship:
15 
    (current account surplus) = (government budget surplus)  
      + (savings of SOES – investments by SOEs)  
      + (savings of the non-state sector – investments of the non-state sector)  
 
  The facts for the recent period are that the current account surplus (or, loosely speaking, 
the trade surplus) is positive, the government budget surplus is negative at an unprecedented 
level, and SOE savings are less than SOE investments.  This means that the savings of the non-
state sector must greatly exceed the investments of the non-state sector.   As documented earlier, 
the government has sought to fight the deflation by increasing public works (i.e. running record 
budget deficits) and encouraging SOE investments to soak up the excess savings.  The rise in 
total investments has not been sufficient to use up the excess savings, however, and this residual 
excess savings have leaked abroad in the form of an aggregate trade surplus.  Inadequate 
financial intermediation has made China a capital exporting country! 
  This perverse current account outcome is not new.  Taiwan had exactly this problem up 
to the mid-1980s when all Taiwanese banks were state-owned and were operated according to 
the civil service regulation that the loan officer had to repay any bad loan that he had approved.  
                                                 
14 Woo (2000) presents a proposal of how to meet the investment financing needs in rural China. 
15 It is important to note that the above equation applies only to China's total trade surplus not to any 
bilateral trade surplus between China and that country.  The equation in standard textbook notation is: 
  CA = (T-G) + (S-I) 
         15 
The result was a massive failure in financial intermediation that caused Taiwan's current account 
surplus to be 21 percent of GDP in 1986.   
  China's proclivity to generate persistent current account surpluses has managed to 
manifest itself only after 1994 because of major policy changes implemented in that year.  
Before 1994, with the government budget deficit being usually small, the voracious absorption of 
bank loans by SOEs, in the soft-budget environment, to invest recklessly kept the current account 
usually negative.  In 1994, Zhu Rongji implemented stricter controls on the SOBs to reduce the 
then 24 percent inflation rate and the explosion of NPLs.  This lower growth rate in SOE 
investments from 1995 onward is the reason why China's built-in propensity toward current 
account surplus has been revealed only from 1995 onward.  The pronounced tendency toward 
higher current account surpluses is mainly caused by the secular rise in the savings of the 
nonstate sector for the reasons we identified earlier, e.g. secular rise in the required amount of 
startup capital, secular improvement in the official attitude toward market capitalism.
16  The 
reason why China is not producing the gargantuan current account surpluses seen in Taiwan in 
the mid-1980s is because of its record budget deficit and the still excessive amount of SOE 
investments.  
  Obviously, increasing budget deficits and SOE investments to counter deflation and 
reduce the trade surplus can only be a satisfactory solution in the short-run.  In the long-run, the 
increased public investments could follow an increasingly rent-seeking path that is wasteful as in 
Japan (e.g building a 2nd big bridge to a lowly-populated island to benefit a politically-
connected construction company), and the increased SOE investments could convert themselves 
                                                 
16 Of course, just as the current account outcome is the product of the three terms in the equation, multi-
variable causation also applies to the savings outcome, e.g. demographic features, expected future income 
growth.  Our discussion has concentrated on how one of these variables, the type of financial 
intermediation mechanism, can affect the savings rate.          16 
into nonperforming loans at the SOBs.  The right solution to the problem of excess saving is not 
for the government to absorb it by increasing its budget deficit but to establish an improved 
mechanism for coordinating private savings and private investments.  This solution is correct 
regardless of the veracity of our hypothesis about investment-motivated savings.  We will argue 
later in the paper that the formation of domestic private banks, and the entry of foreign banks 
will correct the problem of inadequate financial intermediation, and eradicate the deflationary 
tendencies created by the liquidity trap and the paradox of thrift.  But first, we look at the present 
state of China's banking system. 
 
Section 4: The Banking System as a Sinkhole 
China's banks are in undeniably serious financial straits.  According to the People's Bank 
of China (PBOC), the proportion of non-performing loans (NPLs) of the four big state-owned  
banks (SOBs) is presently about 26 percent, which is 2 percentage points lower than a year ago.  
However, the recently revealed scandal about improper loans to a Shanghai developer by the 
Hong Kong branch of the Bank of China suggests that there are probably still undiscovered black 
holes in the banks' books.  Table 5 presents estimates by Citigroup (2002) that put NPLs to be 35 
percent of outstanding loans at the four big SOBs at the beginning of 2002, and the average 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of these four banks to be 5.0 percent. 
The bank reform efforts of the past several years have failed.  The proportion of NPLs 
has come down from its record high of 48 percent in 1998, but this reduction was achieved 
mainly by the transfer of the NPLs to the state-owned asset management corporations (AMCs).  
The major portion of the transferred NPLs still needs to be disposed and is thus still the         17 
responsibility of the People's Bank of China or the Ministry of Finance.
17  Worse, most of the 
problem SOEs remain clients of the parent banks and continue to create new NPLs.  What has 
facilitated the creation of new NPLs is the intermittent pressure on the banks from the 
government to expand investment credit to combat deflation, and to expand social stability loans 
to reduce firm closures.  This may be an important reason why the quality of banking assets has 
deteriorated rapidly during the past years, causing the capital adequacy ratio to fall to 5 percent 
in early 2002 from the 8-plus percent achieved in late 1998 after the recapitalization of the 
banks. 
The reason why we ended the last paragraph on a tentative note is because it is possible 
that a large part of the post-1998 NPLs may actually be pre-1998 NPLs that were not recognised 
as such during the 1998 recapitalisation.  At that time, the SOBs might not have wanted to reveal 
the actual NPL situation because this would have exposed previous official NPL estimates to 
have been wildly inaccurate.  In any case, the state banks are now in need of another round of 
recapitalization. 
  In this situation of a fragile banking system, China has committed itself to opening up the 
banking system completely within five years of joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
which it did in December 2001.  Foreign banks could conduct transactions in foreign currencies 
from the beginning of WTO membership, conduct transactions with the local corporate sector in 
Renminbi after two years, and conduct transactions with local households in local currencies 
after five years.  Although foreign banks are likely to compete only in the coastal cities, at least 
in the initial period, the pressure on domestic banks can be high as the big four banks extract 
                                                 
17 It appears that the AMCs have started by concentrating on the "NPLs with the best prospect for 
recovery", and that the "average cash-recovery rate" on the small amount processed by June 2002 is 21 
percent.  This recovery rate is expected to drop substantially when the more difficult loans are processed.  
See "On the Road to Ruin," Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 November 2002.         18 
about 95 perccent of their profits from about half a dozen coastal cities (Shanghai, Beijing, 
Xiamen, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Tianjin).  Because there is no depositor insurance in China, 
the obvious question is whether depositors will believe that these foreign banks will drive the 
SOBs into open bankruptcy, and hence rush to withdraw their savings from the SOBs, setting in 
motion the vicious downward spiral of credit contraction, leading to business failures, rendering 
sound financial institutions insolvent, and contracting credit further. 
  Our reading is that even if pressures on the state banks do occur through depositor 
withdrawals, there is no need for a full-blown crisis, since the central bank will be able to issue 
currency to the state banks to meet the withdrawals.  This expansion of high power money 
cannot be easily translated into a loss of foreign reserves because capital controls, which we 
support, remain in place and are likely to do so for the forseeable future.  The resulting 
expansion of high power money will also not have much impact on inflation because this is 
mainly a shift out of bank deposits into cash, or from some banks to others, and not a shift into 
goods.  In fact, in the present deflationary atmosphere, a run from bank deposits to goods is a 
macroeconomically stabilising development!  Simply put, the government has the technical 
ability to accommodate shifts in bank deposit preferences, even a modest bank run, without 
risking exchange rate collapse or a runaway inflation 
However, the fact that the government can prevent a bank run from causing a financial 
meltdown is not good enough.  If the banking system is plagued by frequent bank runs, it's role 
as a financial intermediary will be greatly reduced, and economic growth could suffer 
significantly.  The real issue is not whether depositor shifts, or a bank run, could be 
accommodated but how to prevent a banking crisis from occurring in the first place.  Because 
depositors have the incentive to withdraw their funds as long as the banks are seen to be         19 
insolvent, the prevention of banks requires that the government keep the banks adequately 
capitalised at all times.   
Another reason why the banks deserve recapitalisation is that this will lower the lending 
rate, and hence spur capital formation.  To see how NPLs raise the lending rate, we note that the 
cash-flow constraint that a bank (regardless of solvency) must meet in the absence of state 
subsidies, of operating costs, and of a required reserve requirement is given by: 
rD D = rL [D-NPL] 
rD = deposit rate 
rL = lending rate 
D = amount of deposit 
  This means that if NPL equals one-third of deposits, then the lending rate has to be at 
least 50 percent higher than the deposit rate.  The important implication, however, is that a new 
bank (domestic or foreign) can undercut the lending rate of the existing SOB because it will not 
have any NPLs on it book.  Since the government had recapitalised the banks in 1998, and needs 
to do so again now, the important question is whether there are technical and political obstacles 
that can prevent China from implementing another round of bank recapitalization.  Or, to put it 
differently, how many more rounds of bank recapitalization can China afford without generating 
a fiscal crisis? 
 
Section 5: How Serious is the Threat of Fiscal Insolvency? 
For China, the prolonged use of loose fiscal policy carries two major risks.  The first risk 
is low economic efficiency of the state investments, especially of many of the infrastructure 
projects implemented in the last four years.  Almost all of these projects were implemented by         20 
the SOEs in a rush, with some of the projects were approved even before the feasibility reports 
were completed.  In 1998 and 1999 there were frequent reports about the collapse of bridges and 
roads that were built recently.   This risk of a rise in fiscal inefficiency has been confirmed by an 
internal study of the Ministry of Finance which found that the amount of investment required to 
create one additional unit of GDP has increased significantly in recent years; Gao (2002). 
  The second, and, possibly, more serious, risk to fiscal management is fiscal sustainability.  
The proactive fiscal policy contributes to fiscal risks in two ways ￿ it directly increases both 
fiscal deficits and public debts, and indirectly increases the amount of NPLs by influencing 
banking lending decisions.  A higher debt-GDP ratio means more debt servicing in future 
periods, and this could require expenditure cuts in order to prevent an upward spiral of the debt-
GDP ratio, a development that convince the financial markets that the state is resorting to Ponzi 
scheme to finance its deficits, and cause a shutoff of credit to the state.  
The simple fact is that fiscal sustainability lies at the heart of whether a banking crisis 
would actually occur.  As long as the state is perceived to be able and willing to bail out the 
SOBs, depositors would retain their confidence in the SOBs regardless of the actual state of their 
balance sheets.  The stock of publicly-acknowledged government debt comes to only 16 percent 
of GDP, and so it is usual to hear official assurances that the current fiscal deficits of less than 3 
percent of GDP do not pose a problem for debt servicing by the state.  However, the analytically 
correct measure of public debt should be the consolidated debt of the state sector, which would 
include at least some part of the contingent liabilities (e.g., foreign debts of SOEs and SOBs, and 
unfunded pension schemes in the SOE sector) that the state might have to assume responsibility 
for when the state-owned units default on their financial obligations.  We should note that if an 
analyst counts NPLs as contingent liabilities, then she is really computing what the public debt         21 
will be after one more round of bank recapitalization, i.e. the second bank recapitalization since 
1997.  According to Fan (2003), the consolidated public debt at the end of 2001 was 72 percent 
of GDP; and according to Citibank (2002), see Table 6, it could be as high as 115 percent.  So is 
China's present debt-GDP ratio too low or too high?   
To answer this question, we note that the central government debt-GDP ratios in Italy, 
Sweden and the United States were, respectively, 117.6 percent, 70.8 percent, and 50.5 percent 
in 1995.
18  So if China undertakes its second bank recapitalization since 1997, its public debt will 
still be within the range seen in advanced OECD countries that are not experiencing fiscal crises.  
However, there are two important points to be made to show that this finding is not an optimistic 
one. 
First, the forthcoming recapitalization of China's banks appears to be the last major one 
that the government could implement in the short-term without risking the stability of the 
domestic financial markets and its credit standing in the international financial markets.  A third 
recapitalization (since 1997) will push the debt-GDP ratio to over 150 percent, well above the 
OECD norm. 
Second, if China recapitalizes the SOBs a second time, then it will have to compromise 
the expansionary fiscal policy that has been keeping GDP growth above 7 percent since 1997.  
This is because China raises much less state revenue, as a share of GDP, than the OECD 
countries, and hence has a much lower capacity to service its public debt.  The revenue-GDP 
ratio was 16.2 percent for China in 2001, 30 percent for Italy in 1995, 38 percent for Sweden in 
1995, and 21 percent for the U.S. in 1996.
19  The additional debt service from the second bank 
                                                 
18 The US ratio is for 1996.  Ratios were constructed from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. 
19 The revenue-GDP ratio for China is from Deutsche Bank (2002) which estimated that it will rise to 16.4 
percent in 2002 and 16.6 percent in 2003.  Debt to GDP and revenue-GDP ratios for other countries are 
from the IMF database.         22 
recapitalization will be about 1.5 to 2.5 percent of GDP.
20  If China increases tax collection or 
reduces infrastructure spending to cover this increased debt service, then this second 
recapitalization of the SOBs will reduce the fiscal stimulus that has been keeping the GDP 
growth rate above 7 percent.  Between these two options, expenditure reduction cannot be 
considered the less likely outcome because China's experience in the reform era is that frequent 
changes to the tax system have not been able to raise revenue significantly for a sustained period.  
The reason for the low revenue-GDP ratio could be because increasing tax collection is as much 
a political challenge as it is an administrative challenge. 
If the issue of fiscal sustainability is viewed from the broader picture of debt dynamics, 
one might be tempted to be more optimistic about the present situation, and dismiss the existence 
of a tradeoff between bank recapitalisation and fiscal stimulus as stated in the preceding 
paragraph.  Such an optimistic assessment would be based on the fact that China's annual trend 
growth in the next decade and a half is likely to be at least 7 percent, and so the high debt-GDP 
ratio of 115 percent of today would be reduced over time by the high rate of output growth.  
There is, thus, no need to cut back on the fiscal stimulus in order to service the additional debt 
from the new round of bank recapitalisation, China could just borrow more to cover the 
additional debt service, and wait for the economy to "grow" out of its debt. 
To state the above argument more formally, the optimism is based on the evolution of the 
debt-GDP ratio as given by: 
  d (ln[Debt/GDP]) / d t  =  r + p + b – y        where 
  r = real interest rate on government debt 
  p = primary fiscal deficit rate 
     = [state expenditure excluding debt service – state revenue] / GDP 
                                                 
20 This assumes a bond rate of 4 to 6 percent – an assumption discussed in the next paragraph.         23 
  b = NPL creation rate 
     = [change in NPL in SOB] / GDP 
  y = trend growth rate of real GDP 
  For convenience, we assume y to be 8 percent, and p to be 2 percent.  (According to 
Deutsche Bank, 2003, p was 1.8 percent in 2001 and 2.2 percent in 2002, and is likely to be 2.1 
percent in 2003.)  One seemingly plausible estimate of the real interest rate (r) is 4 percent, 
which is obtained by combining the facts that the government bond rate on 25 March 2003 was 
2.65 percent, and that the inflation rate was about negative 1 percent.  If we now add the 
unrealistic assumption of b = 0 to this contrived example, we see that y exceeds the sum of r and 
p by 2 percentage points, which means that the Debt-GDP ratio will decline over time.   
  However, this safety margin of 2 percentage point for China's debt situation is based on 
the patently wrong assumption of b = 0.  The fact that China must now undertake another 
recapitalisation after 1998 to get rid of NPLs worth 35 percent of GDP suggests that b = 7 
percent!  Only if we make the assumption that the SOBs will be able to reduce the annual NPL 
creation rate (b) to 2 percent of GDP after this second recapitalisation, can we then obtain the 
optimistic conclusion that China can simply grow out of its debt without having to face the 
tradeoff between bank recapitalisation and fiscal stimulus. 
  It is important to note, however, that this optimistic conclusion is also dependent on two 
other highly unrealistic assumptions: 
1.  that there will not be another round of bank recapitalisation in the future – an assumption 
about state banks that has been falsified not only by international experiences but also by 
China's own experience since 1998; and         24 
2.  that China can promote the development of its financial sector without freeing the 
presently state-set interest rates. 
  Because the real interest rate of 4 percent used in the above paragraph is the product of 
interest rate ceilings, we think that the shadow interest rate is likely to be substantially higher.  
As China is a capital shortage country, the real rate of return on physical capital in China must be 
higher than in the United States, which suggests that it is likely to be over 15 percent.  So if there 
were an efficient government bond market in China today, the lower bound of the real 
government bond rate in China could be at least 6 percent.
21  This 2 percentage point rise in the 
real interest rate is made more plausible by the fact that the state would have to issue new bank 
recapitalisation bonds that amount to 40 percent of GDP.  In short, under interest rate 
liberalisation and with b = 2 percent, the primary fiscal deficit (p) would have to be cut from 2 
percent to zero, i.e. the fiscal stimulus would have to be eliminated in order for the Debt-GDP 
ratio not to spiral uncontrollably upward. 
  As international experiences show interest rate liberalisation to be indispensable for the 
deepening the sophistication of financial markets, we really see no reason to be assured about the 
sustainability of China's fiscal situation.  The lesson that we come away from this debt dynamics 
exercise is that we have to be very cautious about the validity of the benign scenario about 
China's fiscal situation.  We see that even with the optimistic assumption of the NPL creation 
rate equaling 2 percent of GDP, China has no margin of safety to ensure fiscal solvency – and 
that remaining on this knife-edge situation requires a tradeoff between maintaining its fiscal 
stimulus to reduce unemployment and liberalising interest rates to promote financial sector 
development.  
                                                 
21 According to Solow (1991), the stylised fact for the real interest rate in the United States is that it is 5 to 
6 percent.         25 
In summary, China's consolidated debt-GDP ratio will be relatively high by international 
standards after a second bank recapitalization, while its revenue-GDP ratio will remain relatively 
low.  The greatest threat to the stability of China's financial market is fiscal sustainability, and 
the biggest threat to fiscal sustainability is successive rounds of bank recapitalization.   This 
precarious outcome is a systemic feature of the current banking system, a relic from the era 
where central planning was the preferred engine of economic growth.  Of course, we cannot 
attribute the creation of NPLs entirely to the SOBs, their chief customers, the SOEs, deserve an 
equal share of the blame.  The fact is that without solving the SOE problem, the problem of 
NPLs cannot be solved.
22 
 
Section 6: Macroeconomic and Social Instability from the State Enterprise Sector 
We must emphasize that the inflationary problem generated by the traditionally biggest 
macroeconomic destabilizer – the SOE sector – still exists.  If anything, the SOE sector in 2003 
has not only become a source of potentially bigger macroeconomic instability, it has also 
emerged as a source of socio-political instability.  To see the origin of these negative 
developments, we review the Fan and Woo (1996) arguement that the reform strategy for the 
SOE sector during the 1978-1993 period was inherently inflationary.
23   
The crux of the 1978-93 SOE reform strategy was to transfer decision-making power 
from the industrial bureaux to the state enterprises.  The increased operational autonomy of the 
SOEs reduced the ability of the industrial bureaux to monitor the financial situation within the 
SOEs, and hence created the incentive for SOEs to greatly increase their demand for investment 
funds.  The reduction in bureaucratic oversight of SOEs in a soft budget environment allowed the 
                                                 
22 See Wen (2003) for a recent analysis on the joint reform of the SOBs and SOEs. 
23 See Huang, Woo, and Duncan (1999) for an account of the failure of SOE reform.         26 
SOEs to use creative accounting to privatise profits from good investment projects, and to 
receive state subsidies to cover losses from bad investment projects.  Until about 1996, the SOEs 
were generally able to satisfy their large appetite for investment because the local governments, 
in the interest of local development, inevitably lobbied the local branches of the state banks to 
grant the SOEs' applications for investment loans.  The evidence overwhelmingly show that the 
local bank branches, at least until 1995, were unable to resist the demand for easy money.
24 
The losses at SOEs exploded after 1992, when mother Russia officially went capitalist, 
because many Chinese SOE managers saw the same fate for China in the future, and concluded 
that this was their last chance to steal.  This is why SOE losses skyrocketed even though GDP 
grew in the range of 10 to 14 percent annually in the 1992-95 period.  By 1995, it was common 
to summarise the SOE situation as one-third of them losing money, and another one-third 
making no money.  From the vantage point of 2003, it seems that continued inefficiency, and de 
facto asset-stripping and embezzlement of firm profits by managers and workers are the primary 
causes for the general decline in SOE profits, with the latter being the more important.  The 
devolution of financial decision-making power to the SOEs, and the steady reduction in 
discrimination against the private sector have made it increasingly easy for the managers to 
transfer state assets to themselves.  It is hence, perhaps, only natural that of the 327 cases of 
embezzlement, bribery and misuse of public funds that were tried in Beijing in 1999, "76 percent 
took place in SOEs."
25   
                                                 
24  The institutional reforms of the central bank and the state banks implemented in July 1993 as part of an 
austerity campaign have not been successful in changing things.  Chen Yuan (1996), Deputy Governor of 
the central bank, reported that "the enthusiasm for economic growth in some localities is so strong that it 
is very difficult to stop completely excessive investment financed through forced bank credit" (emphasis 
added). 
25 "Judicial Attention to SOEs Pledged," China Daily, February 19, 2000.         27 
The increasing public outrage over the inequity of the informal privatisation of the SOE 
sector is well captured in the book by He Qinglian who wrote that the SOE reform has amounted 
to: 
"a process in which power-holders and their hangers-on plundered public wealth.  
The primary target of their plunder was state property that had been accumulated 




The Chinese leadership had, by 1994, recognized the increasingly serious economic and 
political problems created by the principal-agent problem innate in the decentralization reforms 
of Lange-inspired market socialism, and it announced that the clarification of property rights of 
SOEs would be added into its SOE reform program.  The Communist Party of China (CPC) 
publicly committed itself in July 1997 to convert most of the SOEs to publicly traded 
shareholding corporations -- a form of industrial organisation that originated in capitalist 
economies.  The 1994-1997 decisions to address the loss-making SOE problem more decisively 
are the reasons why the employment growth rate in the industrial sector (in Table 2) fell from 2.1 
percent in 1997 to 0.3 percent in 1998, and then went negative in the following years.  (The 
restructuring of the state manufacturing industries had occurred even earlier, in 1996.)    
The state's decision in 1997 to accelerate diversification of the ownership structure of the 
SOEs has to be recognised to be a bold move because the experiences with mass privatization in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) show that the task is an extremely 
difficult one and that the outcomes have consistently fallen below initial expectations.  For 
example, in Russia, the “loans-for-shares” privatization transferred the country's enormous 
mineral wealth to a group of oligarchs, and the weak administrative and legal structures allowed 
                                                 
26 He Qinglian, Zhongguo de Xianjing, (China’s Pitfall), Mingjing Chubanshe, Hong Kong.  The 
translated quote is from Liu Binyan and Perry Link, “China: The Great Backward?” The New York 
Review of Books, October 8, 1998, pp. 19.         28 
many managers to take effective control of the privatized firms and loot them instead of 
improving their operations.  Furthermore, the EEFSU experiences warn that mass privatization is 
an exceedingly dangerous business politically, no matter how it is done, be it outsider 
privatization or insider privatization. This is because the mass privatization of SOEs generates so 
much rent that massive corruption has not been avoided, and the resulting corruption inevitably 
delegitimises the government, e.g. Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic and Boris Yeltsin in 
Russia. 
Despite the mediocre to poor privatisation outcomes in EEFSU, privatisation has been 
going forward in China, albeit with occasional stops, for two main reasons.  The first reason 
comes from John Nellis (1999) who points out that “governments that botch privatization are 
equally likely to botch the management of state-owned firms”.  The answer is not to avoid 
privatizations but to implement more careful privatizations: governments in transition economies 
should “push ahead, more slowly, with case-by-case and tender privatizations, in cooperation 
with the international assistance community, in hopes of producing some success stories that will 
lead by example.” 
The second reason lies in that the delay of privatization can be costly to China's 
government politically.  Stealing by managers does occur during privatization and creates a 
social backlash against the government, but the maintenance of the status quo has become 
increasingly difficult because SOE managers in China know from the EEFSU experience that 
they are in an endgame situation.  The widespread spontaneous privatization by SOE managers 
could create grave social instability. 
Our opinion is that the solution to the SOE problem in China is not privatisation per se, 
but a transparent, legal privatisation process that society at large can accept, at the minimum, as         29 
tolerably equitable.  Because an adequate privatisation program must compensate the retired and 
layoff workers, permit takeover by core investors, and respect the rights of minority 
shareholders, it is important that legal reforms be carried out simultaneously.  Only with a 
transparent, equitable privatisation process that is overseen by an adequate legal framework, 
would China be likely to avoid a state-created Russian-style kleptoklatura that would fuel social 
dissatisfaction. 
Recently, there has been some questioning on whether the case for privatisation has been 
overstated.
27  When Zhu Rongji was designated the new premier in 1997, he announced that he 
would solve the SOE problem in three years.  In 2000, he declared victory on the SOE front 
when the profits of the industrial SOEs leaped from 53 billion yuan in 1998 to 241 billion in 
2000.  In a careful study, Zhou and Wang (2002) quantified the sources of the financial 
turnaround, and found that: 
•  the lower interest rate in 2000 increased profits by 52 billion yuan (28 percent of the 
increase in SOE profits); 
•  the higher oil prices boosted overall SOE profits by 79 billion yuan because almost all oil 
companies are state-owned (42 percent of the increase);
28 and 
•  the conversion of the bank loans of SOEs into equities held by state asset management 
companies raised profits by 10 billion yuan (5 percent of the increase).  
About 75 percent of the increase in the profits of industrial SOEs in the 1998-2000 period 
was not due to actions taken within these enterprises but to external factors.  When Zhou and 
Wang (2002) calculated the profit rate after deducting the profits from the more favorable 
external environment, they found that it had increased from 0.7 percent in 1998 to 1.2 percent in 
                                                 
27 See Nolan and Wang (1999) for a recent assertion of a turnaround in SOE performance,. 
28 This estimate has taken into account the additional production cost of the non-oil SOEs.         30 
2000 for the SOE sector, and from 2.8 percent to 4.8 percent for the non-SOE sector.  Despite the 
recent good news on SOE profitability, the fact remains that the SOE sector still lags 
considerably behind the non-SOE sector in efficiency.   
To sum up, while the recent rise in profits surely gives some breathing space, the capacity 
of SOEs to “dissipate rents” through high payments to managers and workers, if not illegal 
transfer of assets, should remain clearly in the policy makers' minds.  Thus, any gains could well 
be squandered, if not reversed, in a relatively short period of time.  It is hence important for 
China to replace the present uncontrolled (and uncontrollable) process of asset-stripping in the 
SOE sector with transparent and equitable privatisation in order to improve macroeconomic 
stability and to defuse socio-political instability.  
 
Section 7: Conclusion 
We have argued that China's dysfunctional financial system has imparted a deflationary 
bias to the economy and made China a capital exporting country by constraining the growth of 
aggregate demand to be less than the growth of aggregate supply.  The government has been 
actively trying to neutralise deflation through an aggressive fiscal policy.  We recommend that it 
should now expand its investment program to incorporate large import-intensive infrastructure 
projects so that the trade surplus could be reduced as well.  This move would be a better 
alternative to the appreciation the RMB as suggested by China's foreign friends.  The additional 
infrastructure construction would create jobs, relieve production bottlenecks, and, on top of that, 
preserve employment in China's export-oriented sectors.  However, the most efficient solution is 
for private investment rather than public investment to recycle the pool of private savings back         31 
into the economy.  The key to eradicating the deflation bias and the tendency toward current 
account surplus lies in establishing an efficient financial intermediation mechanism.  
If the Chinese government decides to keep the SOBs as the dominant financial 
intermediation mechanism, then we think that there is really little to be gained by recapitalizing 
the SOBs.  This suggests that one possibly effective way to slow down the pace of NPL creation 
in an SOB-dominated financial system and keep the fiscal situation sustainable is to keep the 
NPLs on the books of the SOBs, and, as suggested by Fan Gang (2003), "the financial status of 
these loans should be constantly watched and openly discussed" in the public media.   
One must note, however, that in order for Fan Gang's suggestion to work, it is necessary 
that the foreign banks (which will no longer face more restrictions than Chinese banks by 2008), 
for some reasons, will not expand aggressively out of the big coastal cities to blanket the rest of 
the country with branches in a short period of time.  If the foreign banks do so, then their lower 
costs from the absence of nonperforming loans will allow them to charge lower lending rates 
than the SOBs.  This will eliminate the SOBs because WTO regulations make it illegal for the 
government to subsidise the SOBs against foreign competition.  Our guess is that Fan Gang's 
method can work for about seven to ten years because we think that only HSBC and Citibank are 
likely to actively expand their banking network in China in the next decade, and even then 
mostly in the major coastal provinces. 
The most important priority for financial sector reform is the appearance and growth of 
competitive domestic private banks.  As China is required by its WTO accession agreement to 
allow foreign banks to compete against its SOBs on an equal basis by 2007, it would be akin to 
self-loathing not to allow the formation of truly private banks of domestic origin.  There is no 
reason to favor foreign private banks over domestic private banks, and no reason why China         32 
should not allow its best financial minds compete with, and achieve the same glorious success of, 
the best foreign financial minds.  We therefore recommend that, right after the recapitalisation of 
the big four state banks, at least two of them be broken into several regional banks, and that the 
majority of these regional banks be privatized.
 29  At the same time, the laws on the establishment 
of new banks should be loosened, and interest rates be deregulated.  However, it is most crucial 
that financial sector liberalization proceeds no faster than the development of the financial 
regulatory ability of the state.  Even then, the danger of substituting financial crash for financial 
repression is still a real one.  A modern financial system requires a modern system of financial 
supervision and prudential regulation for its proper functioning. 
It would be a good idea to sell a few of the regional state banks to foreign banks.  This 
will facilitate the transfer of modern banking technology to Chinese banks.  The more local staff 
the foreign bankers train, the larger is the pool of future managers for Chinese-owned banks.  An 
accelerated process of promoting the growth of sound domestic private financial institutions and 
allowing the entry of foreign financial institutions would certainly shorten the time it would take 
for Shanghai it to assume its rightful place among the major international financial centers, and 
to contribute to more efficient intermediation of the world's savings.    
We should mention that entry of Western banks into China’s financial markets is not the 
same thing as liberalization of the capital account in the balance of payments.  We do not believe 
that China would be well served by a rapid opening of the capital account, since that could 
subject China to rapid swings of short-term capital in the same manner that has whipsawed the 
economies of Southeast Asia and Latin America.  Just as in financial market liberalization, 
                                                 
29 Partial recapitalisation is likely to occur soon, and it is likely that the target would be the reduction of 
the NPL ratio from 35 percent to 15 percent.  The cost is estimated to be range from 700 million yuan to 1 
trillion yuan (7 to 10 percent of GDP) – see "Massive bailout proposed for banks," South China Morning 
Post, 26 August 2003.         33 
capital account opening should also proceed gradually and in stages, because it must be 
accompanied by sophisticated financial market regulation, something that is clearly not in place 
at this time.  The fact is that foreign banks could suddenly become conduits for large-scale 
capital flight, or for rapid swings in short-term lending and repayments, or facilitators of bank 
runs (in which depositors do not merely switch banks, or switch from domestic banks to 
domestic currency, but actually switch from domestic deposits to foreign assets). 
We must stress that, beside successive rounds of bank capitalisation, there are other 
shocks that would undermine the fiscal sustainability of the state.  One such shock would be an 
AIDS pandemic that would send state spending on public health soaring, and another would be 
massive construction to offset major ecological disasters and significant climactic changes (e.g. 
water shortage in northern provinces, alternative energy systems to traditional methods of 
burning coal).  We note that the fiscal burden aside, these two examples are new macroeconomic 
challenges that the proven policies of China's past economic managers cannot solve.  The SARS 
epidemic is an important reminder that macroeconomic stability depends on more than just 
keeping focus on the traditional shocks (e.g. changes in sales taxes) to the aggregate 
macroeconomic accounts like the state budget deficit and the trade account balance.  The fact 
that the economic costs of SARS had been greatly magnified by an inadequate public health 
system and by structural weaknesses in information dissemination within China reveals that 
China's new leaders should take a more comprehensive view about the nature of economic 
growth and about the implications of existing social-political controls for macroeconomic 
management.  
  We end this paper by pointing out that there can be no greater confirmation of China's 
determination to make the private sector its new growth engine than by the tenacity in which it         34 
pursued and achieved WTO membership.  WTO is expressly an organization limited to private 
market economies, and it requires that the economic institutions of its members converge within 
a specified period to some broadly defined norms (which are compatible with the main forms of 
market capitalism).  The challenge to China's new leaders is the proper management of this 
internationally supervised process of institutional convergence when China has been 
experiencing low or negative employment growth in the industrial sector in the four years 
leading up to WTO accession.
30  The fiscal burden of installing the new economic growth engine 
is a heavy one, and our analysis shows that China can just afford it.  The absence of a safety 
margin in fiscal management highlights the importance of competent economic management, 
which we are confident of its existence in China; but then the absence of a safety margin also 
highlights the importance of continued good luck on dimensions like normal weather and 
favorable external security, which we can only hope for.  While the many reform tasks ahead are 
challenging, we take heart in that during the 1979-2002 period, some almost as difficult 
challenges had been faced and overcome.  History certainly justifies cautious optimism on 
China's success in moving the drive shaft of its economic engine from the public sector to the 
private sector.  
                                                 
30 Recent insightful discussions on the conditions for meeting this challenge successfully, and on the 
impact of WTO accession on the Chinese economy are Lu, Wen and Zhou (2003), Song (2002a), Song 
(2002b), and Yu (2003).         35 
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           (Rate of change, in percent)
1979 7.6 2.0 NA
1980 7.8 6.0 NA
1981 5.2 2.4 NA
1982 9.1 1.9 NA
1983 10.9 1.5 NA
1984 15.2 2.8 NA
1985 13.5 8.8 9.3
1986 8.8 6.0 6.5
1987 11.6 7.3 7.3
1988 11.3 18.5 18.8
1989 4.1 17.8 18.0
1990 3.8 2.1 3.1
1991 9.2 2.9 3.4
1992 14.2 5.4 6.4
1993 13.5 13.2 14.7
1994 12.6 21.7 24.1
1995 10.5 14.8 17.1
1996 9.6 6.1 8.3
1997 8.8 0.8 2.8
1998 7.8 -2.6 -0.8
1999 7.1 -3.0 -1.4
2000 8.0 -1.5 0.4
2001 7.3 -0.8 0.7
2002 8.0 -1.3 -0.8
1st half of 2003 8.2 -0.4 0.6
average 1979-2002 9.40 5.53 NA
average 1979-1996 9.92 7.84 NA
average 1997-2002 7.83 -1.39 0.16
variance 1979-1996 11.239 42.412 NA
variance 1997-2002 0.348 1.846 2.307
t-statistic for difference in
  the means of 1979-1996
  and 1997-2002 2.521 5.661
Source: China Statistical Yearbook , 2001 and 2002 editions          38 
 
 
Table 3. Growing Fiscal Spending 
   Fiscal  Fiscal  Fiscal    Spending   
  revenue  expenditure  Balance  Share  on capital  Share 
        of GDP  construction  of GDP 
  (Rmb billion)  (Rmb billion)  (Rmb billion)  (%)  (Rmb billion)  (%) 
1997  865.1  923.4  -58.2  -0.7  102.0  1.4 
1998  987.6  1079.8  -92.2  -1.1  138.8  1.8 
1999  1144.4  1318.8  -174.4  -1.9  211.7  2.6 
2000  1339.5  1588.7  -249.1  -2.5  209.5  2.4 
2001  1637.1  1884.4  -247.3  -2.7  251.8  2.6 
2002 
2003 




   
Source: Citigroup  
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Table 4: Investment Trends by Ownership
investment as percent of GDP
investment refers to fixed asset investment
Total Rural SOE
1981 19.8 5.1 13.7
1982 23.2 6.2 16.0
1983 24.1 7.0 16.0
1984 25.6 7.7 16.5
1985 28.4 7.6 18.7
1986 29.6 8.0 20.4
1987 30.4 8.9 19.2
1988 30.1 8.9 18.5
            (June 4th Tian An Men Disruption, 1989-1991)
1992 29.5 7.5 19.8
1993 36.0 8.0 22.1
1994 36.4 7.5 20.6
1995 34.2 7.5 18.6
1996 33.8 7.9 17.7
1997 33.5 7.7 17.6
1998 36.3 7.5 19.6
1999 36.4 7.5 19.4
2000 36.8 7.5 18.5
2001 38.8 7.5 18.4
average 1984-1988 28.8 8.2 18.7
average 1992-1996 34.0 7.7 19.8
average 1997-2001 36.3 7.5 18.7
1984 was the year that the central government gave the clear signal
     that it had no ideological objection to the formation of rural enterprises
Rural = rural collectives and rural individuals
SOE = state-owned units only, does not include state-controlled units
           listed as under various types of joint-owned units (e.g.
           share-holding units, joint-venture units)
Source: China Statistics Yearbook,           40 
 
Table 5. Rising Fragility of China’s Banking Sector 
  End-1996  End-1998  Beginning-2002 
Proportions of NPLs (%)       
    Big four banks  40.0  48.0  35.0 
    Ten joint-stock banks  ￿  13.5  15.5 
Average CAR (%)       
    Big four banks    4.4  >8.0    5.0 
Notes: NPLs: nonperforming loans; CAR: capital adequacy ratio. Proportion of non-performing loans for the four major banks for 
1996 and 1998 are re-estimated based on new information made available at the beginning of 2001. The proportion for 2001 
excluded the Rmb1.4 trillion transferred to the Asset Management Companies in the previous year. 
Source:  Citigroup (2002) estimates. 
 
 
Table 6. Contingent Liabilities in China, End of 2001  
  RMB billion  % of GDP 
Accumulated public debts    1,550    16.2 
Special T-bonds in 1998 for recapitalization       270      2.8 
Estimated costs for bank restructuring    4,500    46.9 
Estimated costs for social security funds    2,500    26.1 
Municipal government contingent debt       700      7.3 
External debts    1,500    15.6 
Total  11,020  114.9 
Note: This is an updated estimation based on new information available on both gaps in social security funds and municipal 
government contingent debts that the central government is the guarantor for. These were estimated based on communication with 
government economists. 
Source: Citigroup (2002) estimates. 
    
 
Table 2: Employment in China's Industries, 1978-2001
Employment Level Employment Share  Growth in Employment
Secondary Manufacturing Secondary Manufacturing Secondary Manufacturing
Industry Sector Industry Sector Industry Sector
(in millions) (percent of total employment)   (percent per year)
1978 69.5 53.3 17.3 13.3
1988 121.5 86.5 22.4 15.9 5.8* 5.0*
1989 119.8 85.5 21.6 15.4 -1.4 -1.2
1990 138.6 86.2 21.4 13.3 15.7 0.9
1991 140.2 88.4 21.4 13.5 1.1 2.5
1992 143.5 91.1 21.7 13.8 2.4 3.0
1993 149.6 93.0 22.4 13.9 4.2 2.1
1994 153.1 96.1 22.7 14.3 2.3 3.4
1995 156.5 98.0 23.0 14.4 2.2 2.0
1996 162.0 97.6 23.5 14.2 3.5 -0.4
1997 165.5 96.1 23.7 13.8 2.1 -1.5
1998 166.0 83.2 23.5 11.8 0.3 -13.5
1999 164.2 81.1 23.0 11.4 -1.1 -2.5
2000 162.2 80.4 22.5 11.2 -1.2 -0.8
2001 162.84 80.8 22.3 11.1 0.4 0.5
* Annual compound growth rate between 1978 and 1988
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1990 to 2001 data from 2002 edition, and earlier data from 2001 edition
2002 and 2003 GDP growth rates are from Citigroup (2003)        1 
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